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Defining whether a financial institution is systemically important (or not) is challenging 
due to (i) the inevitability of combining complex importance criteria such as institutions’ 
size,  connectedness and substitutability; (ii) the ambiguity of what an appropriate 
threshold for those criteria may be; and (iii) the involvement of expert knowledge as a 
key input for combining those criteria.  
 
The proposed method, a Fuzzy Logic Inference System, uses four key systemic 
importance indicators that capture institutions’ size, connectedness and substitutability, 
and a convenient deconstruction of expert knowledge to obtain a Systemic Importance 
Index.  
 
This method allows for combining dissimilar concepts in a non-linear, consistent and 
intuitive manner, whilst considering them as continuous –non binary- functions. Results 
reveal that the method imitates the way experts them-selves think about the decision 
process regarding what a systemically important financial institution is within the 
financial system under analysis.  
 
The Index is a comprehensive relative assessment of each financial institution’s 
systemic importance. It may serve financial authorities as a quantitative tool for 
focusing their attention and resources where the severity resulting from an institution 
failing or near-failing is estimated to be the greatest. It may also serve for enhanced 
policy-making (e.g. prudential regulation, oversight and supervision) and decision-
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Defining whether a financial institution
3 is systemically important or not may be 
decidedly intricate but key to the oversight, supervision and regulation of the financial 
system. To be able to identify systemic importance may serve the purpose of assisting 
financial authorities in focusing their attention and resources –the intensity of oversight, 
supervision and regulation- where the systemic severity resulting from a financial 
institution failing or near-failing is estimated to be the greatest. Identifying systemically 
important institutions may also serve financial authorities for enhanced policy-making 
(e.g. prudential regulation, oversight and supervision) and decision-making (e.g. 
resolving, restructuring or providing emergency liquidity). 
 
As a consequence of the global financial crisis that began in August 2007 the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) developed a set of guidelines and recommendations on 
how national authorities can assess the systemic importance of financial institutions, 
markets or instruments. Among the recommendations and concerns of the document 
(hereafter referred as IMF et al., 2009) it is worthwhile emphasizing the following:  
 
•  Three key criteria that are helpful in assessing and identifying the systemic 
importance of financial institutions are: size,  connectedness and 
substitutability.
4 
•  A high degree of judgment founded in a detailed knowledge of the functioning of 
the financial system is required in any assessment of systemic importance. 
•  Assessing the systemic importance of an institution does not lend itself to binary 
outcomes. 
•  The assessment of systemic importance cannot be based simply on 
quantitative methods. 
•  From an operational point of view a qualitative framework could be used to 
integrate the different components of the assessment and help arrive at 
judgments of systemic importance. 
 
Authors recognize that Engineering has faced similar challenges when designing 
practical solutions to complex multifactor and non-linear systems where human 
reasoning, expert knowledge and imprecise information are valuable inputs. One of the 
solutions provided by Engineering is the design and implementation of a Fuzzy Logic 
Inference System (FLIS).  
 
                                                 
3 For this document the authors embrace the term “financial institution” as comprising depository 
institutions (e.g. banks or savings associations), brokers, dealers, investment companies (e.g. mutual 
funds), insurance companies, investment advisers and credit unions; this is, those that may not be 
regarded as a “financial market utility”, where the latter is defined as in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act: “any person that manages or operates a multilateral system for the 
purpose of transferring, clearing or settling payments, securities, or other financial transactions among 
financial institutions or between financial institutions and the person”. 
4  A consultative document by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS-BIS, 2011) suggests 
adding two criteria (i.e. cross-jurisdictional activity and complexity) in order to attain banks’ global 
systemically importance and the difficulty of resolving a systemic event. Because the herein document 
focuses on non-global banking and non-banking institutions’ systemic importance, and since derivatives 
and other complex instruments are rather scarce in the Colombian market, the criteria is limited to size, 
connectedness and substitutability, as originally suggested by IMF, BIS and FSB (IMF et al., 2009). 
However, as discussed below, the methodology would be able to consider these two or other criteria.       3 
 
Fuzzy Logic has been extensively employed in the real world, mostly in an Engineering 
context, to control systems where the timing and level of inputs are at least to some 
extent uncertain (Cruz, 2002). Some of its most important applications include NASA’s 
software design for safe and reliable autonomous landing of spacecrafts and rover 
navigation (Serrano and Seraji, 2007; Howard and Seraji, 2002 and 2000; Tunstel et 
al., 2001; Seraji, H., 2000), along with everyday applications to medicine, automotive 
industry, water treatment, air and ground traffic control, and home appliances design 
(Sivanandam et al., 2007; von Altrok, 2002 and 1996; Klir and Yuan, 1995; McNeill and 
Thro, 1994). Its application to Finance and Economics is related to insurance, credit 
card fraud detection, credit risk analysis, bond ratings and operational risk (Reveiz and 
León, 2010; Bojadziev and Bojadziev, 2007; Bundesbank, 1999; McNeill and Thro, 
1994).  
 
This paper presents the authors’ proposal to address the previously mentioned 
recommendations and issues based on the design of a FLIS as in Reveiz and León 
(2010). The key criteria or inputs of the model are [A] volume of deposits and money 
market borrowing; [B] volume of financial assets under management; [C] contribution to 
the large-value payment system; and [D] betweenness centrality, which altogether aim 
to capture size,  connectedness and substitutability for banking and non-banking 
financial institutions, as further described below.
5 According to fuzzy sets theory, each 
input is modeled as consisting of a set of continuous and overlapping functions 
identifiable by linguistic terms (i.e. LOW, MEDIUM and HIGH).  
 
The  expert fuzzy system, which is entitled the task of mimicking expert reasoning 
capabilities, is designed by deconstructing financial authorities’ officers and technical 
staff knowledge about what a systemically important financial institution is. This 
deconstruction is the result of a survey conducted within the central bank’s officers and 
technical staff about how the chosen inputs may interact in the Colombian financial 
market as joint indicators of systemic importance. According to fuzzy sets theory and 
based on the expert fuzzy system, each combination of the inputs is modeled as 
resulting in an output set consisting of continuous and overlapping functions of 
systemic importance, identifiable by linguistic terms (i.e. VERY LOW, LOW, MEDIUM-
LOW, MEDIUM, MEDIUM-HIGH, HIGH, VERY HIGH).   
    
Finally, each institution’s Systemic Importance Index results from simultaneously 
evaluating each institution’s unique combination of inputs according to the expert 
knowledge of Colombia’s central bank’s officers and technical staff, and mapping the 
outputs’ linguistic terms in an ordinal scale or index. This approach is analogous to 
NASA’s research on designing a Fuzzy Logic-based traversability index for safe and 
reliable autonomous rover navigation (Howard et al., 2001; Seraji, 2000), where the 
inputs are the terrain’s slope, roughness and hardness, and of a Fuzzy Logic-based 
landing site quality index for spacecrafts’ autonomous landing on planetary surfaces 
(Serrano and Seraji, 2007; Howard and Seraji, 2000), where the inputs are the terrain’s 
safety (i.e. slope and roughness), fuel consumption and scientific return.  
 
The document is structured as follows: next section briefly introduces the systemic 
importance concept, focusing on the recommendations and concerns provided by IMF 
et al. (2009). Second section introduces Fuzzy Logic basics. Third section addresses 
the design of an expert knowledge-based Systemic Importance Index for financial 
institutions within Fuzzy Logic theory, and presents some aggregated results for the 
                                                 
5 Please note that the inputs capture the current developments regarding the need to complement the too-
big-to-fail criteria with the too-connected-to-fail criteria, as in León et al. (2011), Chan-Lau (2010), 
Machado et al. (2010), ECB (2010), Clark (2010). As will be further discussed the choice of key indicators 
allow for applying the model to capture the importance of –otherwise ignored- non-banking institutions (i.e. 
the “shadow banking system”).    4 
 
Colombian case. Based on the herein proposed model, the fourth section exhibits the 
systemic importance assessment for Colombian financial institutions participating of the 
large-value payment system (CUD) as of May 2011.
6 The fifth section presents some 
final remarks. Exhibits provide further information about some of the methodological 
approaches herein implemented.  
 
 
1  Systemic risk and systemic importance 
As presented by IMF et al. (2009), G20 countries embrace the following –general- 
definition of systemic risk: the risk of disruption of financial services that (i) is caused by 
an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have 
serious negative consequences for the real economy. Regarding payment systems, the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS-BIS, 2011) define it as the risk 
that the inability of a financial institution to meet its obligations could result in the 
inability of other system participants or of financial institutions in other parts of the 
financial system to meet their obligations as they become due. 
 
Irrespective of which of these definitions is embraced, and despite there is no single 
definition of risk that can be completely satisfactory in every situation (Dowd, 2005)
7, it 
is common to think of risk as a function based on two parameters: frequency and 
severity (Condamin et al., 2006), also referred as likelihood and impact, respectively 
(Gallati, 2003). Although academic effort has traditionally focused on systemic 
concerns based on the estimation of systemic risk (i.e. the product of frequency and 
impact, as in Norman et al. (2009)), there is a recent interest in focusing on systemic 
severity or importance.
8   
 
For example, Paul Tucker, Executive Director for Markets and member of the Monetary 
Policy Committee of the Bank of England, pointed out the following (Tucker, 2005):  
 
[T]he interesting question is not whether or not risk will crystallize, as in one form or 
another risks crystallize every day. Rather, the important question is whether, in the 
event of nasty shocks, our capital markets can absorb them or whether they have 
developed characteristics which may, as some suggest, leave them vulnerable. 
 
More recently, as a result of the most recent episode of global financial crisis, the 
consultative report “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures” published by the 
Bank of International Settlements’ Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
(CPSS-BIS, 2011) includes several principles that aim to provide a high degree of 
confidence that a financial market infrastructure will continue operating and serve as a 
source of financial stability even in extreme market conditions. Principles 4 and 7 
emphasize the importance of focusing on the severity of the systemic shocks; the latter 
addresses liquidity risk for financial market infrastructures:  
                                                 
6 Colombia’s large-value payment system (CUD) is a direct participation system where any financial 
institution can maintain deposits and conduct transactions with other participants without the need for an 
agent or intermediary. As of May 2011 participating financial institutions surpassed 145.  
7 A proper definition of risk is beyond the aim of this paper. Interesting reviews of risk definitions and their 
implications can be found in Hubbard (2009).  
8 Some authors (Rebonato, 2007; Taleb, 2007) argue that models and techniques for estimating very low 
probabilities of very disastrous occurrences have demonstrated to yield poor results, and even question 
the usefulness of those models and techniques for capturing extreme adverse events not found in 
historical data. Rebonato (2007) also questions the convenience of regulators using VaR-type approaches 
(i.e. based on estimating low probabilities) to determine prudential capital since even a high percentile 
(e.g. 99%) would allow a firm to incur losses equal to its regulatory capital rather often (i.e. 2-3 times a 
year); not to mention if extreme losses cluster, as they do.     5 
 
 
Principle 7 (Liquidity Risk): A financial market infrastructure should maintain sufficient 
liquid resources to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday settlement of 
payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential 
stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of [one/two] 
participant[s] and [its/their] affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity 
need in extreme but plausible market conditions. 
 
Such increasing interest in the impact of systemic shocks –beyond the interest in their 
frequency- results from the intrinsic characteristics of the financial and payments 
systems. As pointed out by Haldane (2009) and León et al. (2011), financial and 
payments networks nowadays may be described as robust to random disturbances, but 
highly susceptible to targeted attacks.
9 This results from the systemic importance of 
financial institutions (e.g. size, connectedness, substitutability) being distributed with a 
high degree of asymmetry (right skew) and excess kurtosis, where the average 
institution is of low systemic importance (Figure 1, upper panel) and the average 
default or failure-to-pay results in low systemic severity (Figure 1, lower panel); 
correspondingly, systemically important institutions and their consequent high systemic 
severities lurk in the extreme right tail of the distributions.  
 
Figure 1 
Systemic importance and systemic severity 
 
Source: authors’ design.  
 
This means that traditional focus on estimating risk as the sum of multiplying each 
participant’s estimated frequency of failure (or near failure) times its corresponding 
estimated impact may be dangerously diverting financial authorities from its aim of ever 
preserving financial stability and payment systems safety: on average the financial 
stability and payments system safety may be “guaranteed”, but not when confronted 
with a systemically important participant failing.
  This is, focusing on estimating 
probabilities of systemic events happening financial authorities would be preparing 
                                                 
9 As mentioned by Haldane (2009), this explains why there exist long periods of apparent robustness, 
where peripheral –not systemically important- nodes are subject to random shocks, and short but severe 
episodes of systemic distress, where systemically important institutions endanger financial stability. 
Therefore Haldane’s characterization of the current international financial network: “robust-yet-fragile”.  
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themselves (i.e. overseeing, supervising, regulating) for a severe systemic shock 
based on the impact of a single –systemically modest- average institution. 
 
Moreover, estimating systemic risk as the sum of multiplying each participant’s 
estimated frequency of failure (or near failure) times its corresponding estimated impact 
assumes that failures or near failures by different participants do not come together 
(i.e. they are independent).
10 As recently exhibited by the concurrent episodes of 
distress of AIG, Lehman and Bear Sterns, such independence is by no means 
guaranteed.    
 
Therefore, as financial authorities should be prepared to confront a non-average but 
extreme threat to financial stability or payment systems’ safety, the supervision, 
oversight and regulation should be designed to cope with one (or even two) 
systemically important institution(s) failing or near failing, as suggested by CPSS-BIS 
(2011) when formulating Principles 4 and 7 for measuring, monitoring and managing 
credit and liquidity risks for financial infrastructures. In this sense financial authorities’ 
prudential supervision, regulation and oversight (i.e. policy-making) and decision-
making rely on defining what systemic importance is, and identifying institutions that 
comply with such definition.   
 
According to IMF et al. (2009), G-20 members state that an institution may be 
considered as systemically important if its failure or malfunction causes widespread 
distress, either as a direct or indirect impact (i.e. contagion), where the main criterion 
for assessing systemic importance relates to their potential to have a large negative 
impact on the financial system and the real economy. This overall criterion may be 
conveniently explained by three more concise criteria: size,  connectedness and 
substitutability (IMF et al., 2009; Manning et al., 2009).  
 
 
1.1  Size  
Some authors regard an institution as systemically important when exceeding an asset-
size cutoff (Saunders et al., 2009), whilst others (IMF et al., 2009) prefer to gauge the 
amount of financial services it provides to the system. This is the traditional approach 
to systemic risk, where the systemic importance of a financial institution generally 
increases with its size, where systemically important institutions are labeled as too-big-
to-fail.  
 
When considering the amount of financial services provided to the system as the metric 
for size some intuitive and straightforward key indicators emerge. Because they belong 
to the traditional institution-centric approach to micro-prudential supervision, standard 
accounting data already contains relevant information, such as balance and off-balance 
sheet exposures (e.g. deposits, money market borrowing and lending) and volume of 
assets it warehouses or manages, etc.. Other relevant size indicators such as the 
volume of payments by individual institutions are not publicly disclosed, but are 
available for financial authorities via their involvement in large-value payment systems 
or via their oversight and supervision duties.    
 
 
                                                 
10 When estimating market risk this inconvenience is absent: it is impossible that two (or more) scenarios 
crystallize; there is a unique outcome (i.e. if return resulted to be 1.2% all other realizations are 
impossible), thus assuming independence of each realization is appropriate. For estimating systemic or 
credit risk, where simultaneous occurrence of outcomes is feasible (e.g. several firms may enter into 
default simultaneously or within a short period), this assumption may be inappropriate.      7 
 
 
1.2  Connectedness  
According to the European Central Bank (2010) the properties and behavior of an 
institution may be affected by institutions that have links to it, and also by other 
institutions that have no direct links, but are linked to its neighbors. Therefore, the 
larger the number –and volume- of the links an institution maintains with other market 
participants, the larger the contagion or spillovers it may generate; this is, the systemic 
importance of a financial institution generally increases with its degree of 
connectedness. Despite its intuitiveness this is a rather novel approach to systemic 
risk, where systemically important institutions are labeled as too-connected-to-fail 
(León et al., 2011; Machado et al. 2010; Chan-Lau, 2010; ECB, 2010; Clark, 2010; 
Zhou, 2009).  
 
Unlike financial institutions’ size,  connectedness may be intricate to assess, with 
regulators and central banks currently lacking the resources to carry out this kind of 
analysis (Clark, 2010). Network theory
11 provides some concepts and metrics that may 
assist the assessment of connectedness. The most simple concept is the in-degree 
and out-degree centrality, which refer to the number of “neighbors” or “partners” an 
institution has within the network, where the former (latter) corresponds to incoming 
(outgoing) flows.  
 
Traditional application of network theory for assessing systemic risk relies on balance 
sheet data such as interbank funding and lending, as in Garrat et al. (2011) or Chan-
Lau (2010). Alternatively León et al. (2011) and Machado et al. (2010) use large-value 
payment system’s databases. The choice of connectedness metric and of data source 
(i.e. balance sheet or large-value payment system) will be addressed in the third 
section.        
 
 
1.3  Substitutability  
If the absence of a financial institution distorts the system because it is difficult (or 
impossible) to find another institution able to provide the same (or similar) type and 
volume of financial services (e.g. settlement, payments, interbank lending, custody, 
brokerage), such institution is systemically important. As pointed out by Manning et al. 
(2009), the severity of the impact of a payment system failure, and hence the extent of 
systemic risk, depends critically on whether substitutes are readily available to allow 
payment flows to be rerouted via another system. Consequently, the systemic 
importance of a financial institution generally decreases with its degree of 
substitutability, where connectedness and substitutability are both related to the too-
connected-to-fail criteria. 
 
Unlike financial institutions’ size, the degree of substitutability may be intricate to 
assess. Despite there are cases in which it is easy to determine that a participant or 
infrastructure is non-substitutable (e.g. if there is a sole infrastructure in charge of all 
                                                 
11 Network theory (also referred as network topology or analysis) is a method used in Statistical Physics to 
understand and analyze the structure and functioning of complex networks. As acknowledged in authors’ 
prior works (León et al., 2011; Machado et al., 2010), network theory provides appealing methods and 
techniques to cope with the need to change from an institution-centric to a systemic approach. The studies 
by Soramäki et al. (2006) and Bech and Garrat (2006) use network theory to characterize the United 
States (Fedwire) payment system, while Ianoka et al. (2004) apply it to the Japan case (BoJ-Net). Cepeda 
(2008) applies network theory to the Colombian large-value payment system (CUD) to quantify the impact 
of failures on its stability. 8 
 
the market’s clearing), it may be cumbersome to determine other participants’ degree 
of non-substitutability.  
 
For these cases network theory provides some concepts and metrics that may assist 
the assessment of substitutability. An interesting concept is betweenness centrality 
(Newman, 2010 and 2003; Buechel and Buskens, 2008; de Nooy et al., 2005), which is 
a measure of a network’s resilience based on the assessment of the involvement of a 
participant in the –indirect- connection of all other participants.  
 
As with connectedness, network theory for assessing substitutability could rely on data 
gathered from institutions’ balance sheets (e.g. interbank funding and lending) or from 
large-value payment systems. The choice of substitutability metric and of data source 
(i.e. balance sheet or large-value payment system) will be addressed in the third 




2  Designing an expert knowledge-based index with Fuzzy Logic
12 
The fundamental concept of ordinary sets is “membership”, which states that an 
element belongs or not to a set. This type of sets, described by an unambiguous 
definition and boundaries, is known as ordinary or crisp sets; these sets are 
characterized by discrete–bivariate membership (yes or no, 1 or 0, true or false) and 
classic, Boolean or Aristotelic logic.  
 
In contrast to ordinary sets, Lofti A. Zadeh (1965) acknowledged the fact that in reality 
there are elements characterized by membership functions which are not discrete, but 
continuous, where different degrees of membership exist between yes or no, 1 or 0, 
true or false; this type of sets have unclear boundaries, therefore Zadeh named them 
as fuzzy sets. As stated by Sivanandam et al. (2007), the main contribution of the fuzzy 
set concept is the ability to model uncertain and ambiguous information, the kind of 
information frequently found in real life.   
 
For the case in hand it would be difficult to label a financial institution as too-big-to-fail 
based on a unique threshold related to the size of its assets, as suggested by 
Saunders et al. (2009). Figure 2 compares using a discrete membership function –
typical of ordinary sets- with a fuzzy sets’ continuous membership function, where the 











                                                 
12 This chapter is based extensively on Reveiz and León (2010), where Fuzzy Logic theory and the design 
of a Fuzzy Logic Inference System are briefly explained. Several references were omitted for practical 
reasons. The familiar reader may skip this section. 
13 A membership function is the line which defines the transition between sets, thus mapping the degree of 
membership of the elements of such sets. A continuous membership function, typical of fuzzy sets, 
recognizes that elements may belong to different categories in some degree, with this degree varying in a 
smooth and continuous manner. 9 
 
Figure 2 
Assets’ size as an ordinary and a fuzzy variable 
  
Source: authors design  
 
The discrete membership function (dashed line) may yield non-intuitive and impractical 
results, which could seriously misguide financial authorities’ analysis and decision 
making: (i) despite being clearly different, institution A and B are both regarded as non-
systemically important; (ii) institution C’s size, despite not being significantly different 
from B’s, is considered as resulting in a too-big-to-fail institution; (iii) notwithstanding 
institution D is significantly bigger than C, they are both regarded as equally important 
because of their size.  
 
In the other hand, a simple continuous membership function that replicates the same 
too-big-to-fail approach to systemic risk yields intuitive and practical results. Institution 
A is regarded as non-systemically important, with a null degree membership to the size 
criteria; institution B and C are systemically important to some extent, where B’s 
degree of membership to the too-big-to-fail criteria (20%) is lower than C’s (80%); and 
where D’s size corresponds unequivocally (100%) to a systemically important 
institution due to its size.  
 
Hence, it can be seen that the membership of the elements to the size set is not clearly 
bounded, is a matter of degree, therefore it is better described by a fuzzy set; it is 
straightforward to apply the same rationale to other criteria, such as connectedness 
and  substitutability. This is rather important since, as acknowledged by IMF et al. 
(2009), assessing the systemic importance of a financial institution does not lend to 
binary outcomes. 
 
Additionally, in order to attain greater generality, higher expressive power, an 
enhanced ability to model real-world problems and, most importantly, a methodology 
for exploiting the tolerance for imprecision (Klir and Yuan, 1995), it is possible to use a 
mixture of continuous membership functions to further characterize the degree of 
membership.
14 This is presented in Figure 3: three trapezoidal membership functions 
are used to evaluate the degree of membership with three categories for size (i.e. 
LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH) instead of using a single category (i.e. big), where the nominal 
value of size (e.g. US billion) is replaced by a size index from 0 to 10.
15      
                                                 
14 The choice of the membership function is somewhat arbitrary but should be done with simplicity, 
convenience, speed and efficiency in view (Mathworks, 2009). Cox (1994) emphasize that special 
attention should be drawn to the overlapping between membership functions: the overlapping is a natural 
result of fuzziness and ambiguity associated with the segmentation and classification of a continuous 
space.    
15 The size index consists of a typical standardization of the nominal values of assets’ size for each 









































Assets’ size as a fuzzy variable (input) 
 
Source: authors’ design  
 
This procedure, consisting of the conversion of a crisp quantity to the appropriate fuzzy 
sets through the use of membership functions, is known as fuzzification (Sivanandam 
et al., 2007; Klir and Yuan, 1995; McNeill and Thro, 1994). An important property of this 
procedure is that Fuzzy Logic models are rarely sensitive to the choice of membership 
function (Cox, 1994), making them quite robust, which is an important property when 
models are initially prototyped.  
 
Concerning the logic used to evaluate propositions, ordinary sets rely on ordinary logic; 
this type of logic, also known as classical, Aristotelic or Boolean logic, conceives the 
universe in terms of well-structured categories, where an item is either a member of a 
set or not. Using the logical operators AND, OR and NOT, which correspond to 




Ordinary logical operators 
 
Source: León and Reveiz (2010), based on Mathworks (2009). 
 
Ordinary sets can be regarded as a particular case of fuzzy sets, in which degrees of 
membership are restricted to two extreme alternatives (0 or 1). Due to this fact the 
choice of the Fuzzy Logical operators should be able to preserve the ordinary logical 
operators for bivariate memberships –as in Figure 4- and be capable of evaluating 
multivariate degrees of membership. This is conveniently and typically attained by 
using min(.) instead of AND for conjunction, max(.) instead of OR for disjunction and 1-
(.) instead of NOT for complement.  
 
The existence of these Fuzzy Logical operators allows for developing and evaluating 
fuzzy inference rules, which are rules for deriving truths from stated or proven truths 
(McNeill and Thro, 1994). The set of fuzzy inference rules or  knowledge base that 
                                                                                                                                               
rest is assigned an index value by means of linear interpolation. Such standardization is straightforward 
and makes comparisons and calculations easier. It is important to emphasize that the assessment 
obtained with the Index is not absolute, but relative to the most systemically important institution. 





































contains general knowledge pertaining to a problem domain connects antecedents with 
consequences, premises with conclusions, or conditions with actions (Klir and Yuan, 
1995). If A and B are fuzzy sets, the simplest form of a fuzzy inference rule is the 
following: 
 
if A, then B 
 




If SIZE is [LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH] AND … 
SUBSTITUTABILITY is [LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH] AND … 
CONNECTEDNESS is [LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH],  
THEN SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE IS… 
 [VERY LOW / LOW / MEDIUM LOW / MEDIUM / MEDIUM HIGH / HIGH / VERY HIGH] 
 
Inference rules result from expert knowledge and try to imitate human’s reasoning 
capabilities. Cox (1994) claims that the process of building a knowledge base via the 
design of fuzzy inference rules forces experts to deconstruct their expertise into 
fragments of knowledge, which results in a significant benefit of fuzzy system modeling: 
to gain the ability to encode knowledge directly in a form that is very close to the way 
experts them-selves think about the decision process
16; this is commonly referred as 
“approximate reasoning” (Serrano and Seraji, 2007).   
 
As stressed by Sivanandam et al. (2007), the Achilees’ heel of a fuzzy system is its 
rules; smart rules give smart systems and other rules give less smart or even dumb 
systems. Bojadziev and Bojadziev (2007) emphasize the important role played by the 
experience and knowledge of human experts when developing the knowledge base 
because they are appointed to state the objective of the system to be controlled.  
 
The evaluation of the inference rules is carried out by a fuzzy inference processing 
engine, which is based on the Fuzzy Logical operators previously introduced. The 
fuzzy inference processing engine is in charge of evaluating input’s degree of 
membership to the fuzzy output sets (Figure 5) according to all the inference rules, 
where such evaluation is done simultaneously.
17 As exhibited in Figure 5 the fuzzy 
output set consists of a mixture of seven trapezoidal membership functions for 
systemic importance [VERY LOW / LOW / MEDIUM LOW / MEDIUM / MEDIUM HIGH / 










                                                 
16 Cox (1994) emphasizes that conventional expert and decision systems fail because they force experts 
to crisply dichotomize rules, resulting in an unnecessary multiplication of rules and the inability to articulate 
solutions to complex problems. 
17 According to Cox (1994) the main difference between conventional expert systems and a fuzzy expert 
system is the latter’s simultaneous evaluation of inference rules, which compared to the serial evaluation 
of the former has the advantage of being able to examine all the rules and their impact in the output space. 
18 The choice of the inputs’ and output’s number of membership functions follows two criteria. First, the 
number of membership functions should allow a detailed characterization and differentiation of what a 
systemically important institution is. Second, the number of membership functions should be limited in 
order to avoid unnecessary complexity for the model, and to facilitate deconstructing experts’ knowledge.  12 
 
Figure 5 
Systemic importance as a fuzzy variable (output) 
 
Source: authors’ design.  
 
Each time the fuzzy inference processing engine evaluates an input’s degree of 
membership to the inference rules it maps each solution variable into its corresponding 
output fuzzy set, where the resulting number of output fuzzy sets matches the number 
of inference rules used to evaluate the inputs. For example, as in the left part of Figure 
6, evaluating and mapping an input with three inference rules would result in three 
output fuzzy sets. The aggregation of these three fuzzy sets produces the final output 
fuzzy region, which contains the information of the degree of membership (or truth) of 
the inputs (or propositions) after the simultaneous evaluation of the inference rules.  
 
Afterwards, because a single and crisp quantity is required (i.e. the Index), the best 
representative value –expected value- of the output fuzzy region has to be calculated; 
because of consisting in the conversion of fuzzy into ordinary quantities, this process is 
known as defuzzification, and corresponds to the calculation of the expected value of 
the output (Cox, 1994).   
 
Figure 6 
The Fuzzy Logic Inference System 
 
Source: Reveiz and León (2010). 
 
 



























































































































































(e.g. centroid method)13 
 
According to Sivanandam et al. (2007), Klir and Yuan (1995) and Cox (1994), the most 
used defuzzification method is the centroid, also known as the center of gravity method 
or center of area method.
19 It is calculated as the weighted average of the output fuzzy 
region, and corresponds to the point in the x-axis which divides the output fuzzy region 
into two equal subareas (Figure 6).  
 
For the case in hand the result of the defuzzification is a Systemic Importance Index 
level, as presented in Figure 5’s x-axis. This Index level corresponds to a quantitative 
relative assessment of the systemic importance of each institution based on its inputs 
(criteria) and the expert knowledge embedded in the fuzzy rules set.   
 
Finally, according to McNeill and Thro (1994), the combination of fuzzy inference rules 
and the fuzzy inference processing engine –based on Fuzzy Logical operators- results 
in an expert fuzzy system. Jointly, as in Figure 6, the use of an expert fuzzy system 
and fuzzy sets theory results in a Fuzzy Logic Inference System (FLIS). 
 
 
3  Designing an expert knowledge-based systemic importance 
index 
Based on the basic concepts and procedures introduced in the previous section, and 
based on the criteria defined by IMF et al. (2009) and Manning et al. (2009) (i.e. size, 
connectedness and substitutability), this section presents authors’ proposal for 
designing an expert knowledge-based Systemic Importance Index. Following the 
procedure depicted in Figure 6, this section (i) describes the definition and fuzzification 
of the inputs according to the criteria; (ii) depicts the design of the fuzzy inference rules; 
and (iii) describes the resulting Systemic Importance Index as a product of the 
defuzzification process.  
 
3.1 Defining  and  fuzzifying the inputs         
According to recent literature on systemic importance for financial institutions and 
payment systems (IMF et al., 2009; Manning et al., 2009), the most relevant criteria are 
size, connectedness and substitutability, where the first two relate to their potential to 
have a large negative impact on the financial system and the real economy, whereas 
the latter relates to the magnitude of the indirect impact.  
 
Consequently, the authors define four key indicators that aim to capture size, 
connectedness and substitutability, as exhibited in Table 1. Concurrent with IMF et al. 
(2009) the authors embrace the amount of financial services each institution provides 
to the system as a metric for size, with standard balance sheet data such as volume of 
deposits, money market borrowing and financial assets under management.  
 
Concerning connectedness and substitutability the authors agree with recent literature 
that calls for network theory (ECB, 2010) as a mean to gain a better understanding of 
the financial system. Unlike standard application of network theory, authors avoid using 
                                                 
19 Cox (1994) highlights centroid’s consistency and well-balanced approach, its sensitiveness to the height 
and width of the total fuzzy region and the smooth changes in the expected value of the output across 
observations, behaving similarly to Bayesian estimates; that is, it selects a value that is supported by the 
knowledge accumulated from each executed proposition. Cox also emphasizes that unless there are 
reasons to believe that the model requires a more advanced or specialized method of defuzzification, the 
model should be limited to either the centroid or the max-membership-principle method; therefore, this is 
the authors’ choice. For other –less common- methods please refer to Sivanandam et al. (2007) and Klir 
and Yuan (1995) and Cox (1994). 14 
 
balance sheet data as the input for network theory, and decide to use data from the 
large-value payment system as the primary source of information for assessing both 
criteria; this is also the choice of various authors for analyzing how financial institutions 
interact with each other (Leon et al., 2011; Machado et al., 2010; Cepeda, 2008; 
Soramäki et al., 2006; Bech and Garrat, 2006; Ianoka et al., 2004).  
 
As suggested by León et al. (2011), using large-value payment system data has 
several advantages for assessing connectedness and substitutability: (i) it is not clear 
whether off-balance positions are being captured or not when using claims, whilst 
payments comprise all transactions between payments system’s participants; (ii) unlike 
claims, relying on payments allow for considering liquidity as a key factor in systemic 
risk; (iii) as emphasized by Kodres (2009), failure or insolvency are not the only 
sources of systemic shocks, but mere failure-to-pay or non-payment of transactions 
can gridlock the entire financial system; and (iv) as acknowledged by Tumpel-Gugerell 
(2009), a particular institution might not only be systemically relevant because other 
institutions are financially exposed to it via balance sheet positions, but also because 
other market participants rely on the continued provision of its services. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the choice of broad key indicators follows several 
considerations. First and most important, broad key indicators allow for assessing 
systemic importance of banking and non-banking financial institutions. Unlike most 
models on assessing systemic importance, which are focused on banking institutions 
(as in BCBS-BIS (2011)), the authors consider imperative to be able to consider non-
banking institutions as relevant as banking institutions; as non-banking-related 
systemic events have demonstrated (e.g. LTCM, Lehman, AIG, Bear Sterns, Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae), and as put forward by Ötker-Robe et al. (2011), it is essential to 
improve the understanding of the shadow banking system to prevent non-banking 
institutions gaining systemic importance in an unnoticed manner.
 20 
 
Second, broad key indicators allow for a parsimonious model, which would allow for 
continuous (e.g. monthly) monitoring of systemic importance. Third, broad key 




                                                 
20 Nevertheless each key indicator may be broken down into other –more specific- key indicators, as the 
consultative document by the BCBS-BIS (2011) suggests. Nevertheless, such decomposition may result in 
an implicit preference for assessing systemic importance of some types of financial institutions (e.g. 
commercial banks), whilst overlooking others (e.g. brokerage firms, hedge funds). Hence, authors suggest 
to use wide-ranging key indicators when initially implementing the proposed model, and subsequently 
increasing their specificity if necessary.            15 
 
Table 1
Systemic importance key indicators 
 Key indicators  Description  Source / Estimation  Rationale 







Face value of liabilities a 
financial institution would fail 
to pay to the public and to 
other participants of the 
financial system in the short 
run. 
Balance sheet data provided by the Banking 
Superintendence of Colombia. 
… the larger the deposits and money market borrowing…  
•  the larger the potential loss in confidence of the public. 
•  the larger the potential impact on other institutions liquidity 
and solvency.  
•  the larger the potential monetary impact of central bank’s 







Market value of proprietary 
assets that may be sold in 
order to obtain liquidity in the 
short run, and the volume of 
assets from third parties 
which could be compromised 
or mismanaged in the short 
run in case of a failure or 
near failure. 
Balance sheet data provided by the Banking 
Superintendence of Colombia. 
… the larger the volume of financial assets under 
management… 
•  the larger the potential impact on liquidity and solvency of 
other financial institutions via “liquidity spirals”.
21 
•  the larger the potential impact on the real economy via 
market prices and portfolios’ mismanagement. 
•  the larger the potential monetary impact of central bank’s 






Contribution to the total 
payments of the large-value 
payment system, weighted 
by the contribution to the 
total connections of the 
large-value payment system 
(CUD).   
Large-value payments system statistics provided by 
Banco de la República (CUD).  
… the larger the volume of payments and the number of 
connections… 
•  the larger the number of potential institutions affected and 
the severity of the affectedness.  
•  the larger the potential disruption in the money, capital and 
exchange markets. 
•  the larger the potential monetary impact of central bank’s 





Degree of involvement of a 
participant in the –indirect- 
connection of all other 
participants within the large-
value payment system 
(CUD).  
Estimated as the change in the average number of links 
necessary for each participant to be connected to all 
other participants; if removing an institution results in a 
major (minor or nil) increase in the average number of 
links all institutions require to remain connected as 
before, the removed institution is to be considered as of 
low (high) substitutability.
22  Data provided by CUD.  
… the larger the betweenness centrality…  
•  the higher the potential efficiency and safety losses for the 
system.  
•  the larger the potential disruption in the money, capital and 
exchange markets. 
Source: authors’ design 
                                                 
21 “Liquidity spirals” refers to the internal amplifying process whereby a falling asset leads to more sales (deleveraging), which further drives down asset prices, financial 
intermediaries’ profit and loss statements, and balance sheets’ net worth (Brunnermeier et al. 2009). 
22 Refer to Exhibit B for a brief introduction to the measurement of connectedness and betweenness centrality.  16 
 
Under the size,  substitutability and connectedness criteria proposed by IMF et al. 
(2009) and Manning et al. (2009), authors consider size is to be captured directly by 
key indicators [A] and [B], and indirectly by [C]; connectedness is to be captured 
directly by [C], and indirectly by [D]; and substitutability is to be captured directly by key 




How the selected key indicators of systemic importance relate to criteria from 
IMF et al. (2009) and Manning et al. (2009) 
Key indicators 
Criteria to be captured 
Size Connectedness Substitutability
[A]  Volume of deposits and money 
market borrowing 
   
[B]  Volume of financial assets under 
management 
   
[C] Contribution to the payment system        
 
   




Directly captured       
Indirectly captured      
Non-captured  
Source: authors’ design. 
 
 
Moreover, as presented in Table 3, the four systemic importance key indicators concur 





How the selected key indicators of systemic importance relate to criteria from 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
Key indicators 















[A] Volume of deposits 
and money market 
borrowing 
   
 
 
   
[B] Volume of financial 
assets under 
management 
      
[C] Contribution to the 
payment system 
     
 
 






   
 
Directly captured       
Indirectly captured   
Non-captured  
Source: authors’ design. 
                                                 
23 The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter Dodd-Frank Act) is 
United States of America’s legislative response to the most recent episode of international financial crisis. 
Its main objective is to promote financial stability of the United States, whereas Section 804 of the Act 
addresses the main considerations to designate what systemic importance is.       17 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act considers that a financial market utility or payment, clearing or 
settlement activity may be labeled as systemically important under the following four 
considerations
24: (i) the aggregate monetary value of its transactions, which is to be 
directly captured by key indicator [C], and indirectly by [A] and [B]; (ii) its aggregate 
exposure of their counterparties, which is to be directly captured by key indicator [A], 
and indirectly by [C]; (iii) its relationship, interdependences, or other interactions with 
other participants, which is to be directly captured by key indicators [D] and [C], and 
indirectly by [A]; (iv) the effect that its failure or its disruption would have on critical 
markets, financial institutions, or the broader financial system, which is to be directly 
captured mainly by [A], [B] and [C], and indirectly by [D]. 
 
 
3.2  Designing the fuzzy inference rules         
The fuzzy inference rules were designed in order to capture the expert knowledge of 
financial authorities’ officers and technical staff. First, the authors calculated the 
possible combinations of the three different categories [LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH] for the 
four chosen key indicators; this is, what are all the possible types of financial 
institutions that may result from the combination of the key indicators, where each 
indicator has three possible outcomes?  
 
The number of possible combinations is 81 (i.e. 3




If a financial institution XYZ’s [A] is [LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH] AND … 
 XYZ’s [B] is [LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH] AND … 
XYZ’s [C] is [LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH] AND … 
XYZ’s [D] is [LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH] …  
THEN an XYZ’s SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE IS… 
 [VERY LOW / LOW / MEDIUM LOW / MEDIUM / MEDIUM HIGH / HIGH / VERY HIGH] 
    
Afterwards, all combinations were included in a survey conducted within some of the 
central bank’s officers and technical staff. The individuals taking part in the survey were 
chosen because they (i) are directly involved in the regulatory and decision making 
process of last-resort lending at Colombia’s central bank; (ii) may be considered 




It is worth emphasizing three advantages resulting from using expert knowledge as 
herein proposed. First, deconstructing expert knowledge allows for recognizing the 
main characteristics of the financial system under analysis. It is most likely to find that 
two different financial systems result in two different sets of inference rules, even if the 
panel of experts is the same. Likewise, it is natural to find that the same financial 
system results in different sets of inference rules across time; the evolution of the 
institutional framework, participants, products, services and regulation would explain 
                                                 
24 The Dodd-Frank Act does not limit the considerations to these four; the Act includes a fifth, which states 
that any other factors may be included because of their relevance.   
25 Please note that the inference rules were designed with the AND operator exclusively, which allows for 
effectively covering all possible combinations of financial institutions. Using the NOT operator may help 
reducing the number of rules, but may affect the process of deconstructing expertise into fragments of 
knowledge. Additionally, because all possible combinations of financial institutions may be attained with 
the AND operator, the OR operator was also discarded.  
26 Due to disclosure issues the herein results correspond to a limited sample of five individuals considered 
as experts willing to take the survey. Results are for illustrative purposes, and they do not necessarily 
represent opinions or statements neither of Banco de la República nor of its Board of Directors.  18 
 
such finding. This is why expert knowledge gathered from Colombia’s financial 
authorities’ officers and technical staff is relevant for the Colombian case only.  
 
Second, unlike a weighting approach
27, where the aggregated index results from the –
linear- weighted sum of all key indicators, deconstructing expert knowledge allows for 
capturing non-linearities arising from accumulating key indicators. This is a convenient 
feature since it is intuitive that the systemic risk arising from merging two financial 
institutions is different (i.e. expectedly higher) than the mere sum of their systemic 
risk;
28 different from portfolio theory, where adding assets results in an equal or lower 
volatility of the portfolio, aggregating financial institutions (i.e. their key indicators) may 
result in higher systemic risk. 
 
Third, unlike a fixed weighting approach, where weights remain constant across 
different combinations of key indicators, deconstructing expert knowledge allows for 
capturing non-linearities arising from combining key indicators. This is the case of non-
substitutability:  it is rather intuitive that the more connected or bigger a financial 
institution, the more important its degree of substitutability; substitutability may not be a 
significant factor when the institution’s contribution to the payment system is low, but 
may turn decisive when it is high. This type of non-linearity is ignored when using a 
simple weighting approach, but may be captured by experts’ judgment.  
 
As presented in Exhibit A, the individuals taking part in the survey had to “tick” what 
level of systemic importance results for each of the 81 combinations. A single set of 
rules was obtained from observing the answer that occurred most often in the survey 
(i.e. the mode) for each of the 81 combinations.  
 
Based on Sivanandam et al. (2007) the inference rules or propositions should comply 
with four desirable properties: completeness, consistency, continuity and non-
interactivity. A set of rules is considered (i) complete when any combination of input 
values result in an appropriate output value; (ii) inconsistent if two same rules yield 
different output values; (iii) continuous if it does not have neighboring rules with output 
fuzzy sets that have empty intersections; (iv) non-interactive when inference do not 
relate to each other.   
 
Because the survey do not consider propositions combining two different types of 
institutions (e.g. [IF institution X’s A is HIGH … THEN institution Z’s systemic 
importance is HIGH]), the non-interactivity property is assured. Moreover, because the 
number of rules (81) strictly consists of the attainable rules, no rules are repeated and, 
therefore, consistency is also assured.  
 
Completeness and continuity may be distinguished by visual inspection of the rules set 
and surface plots resulting from the survey; the surface should be continuous and 
                                                 
27 Unlike the approach herein suggested, which uses expert knowledge to determine the importance of 
each key indicator and of all their possible combinations, the consultative document by the BCBS-BIS 
(2011) suggests an equal and fixed weighting approach (i.e. five major key indicators, each one assigned 
a 20% weight). Besides not being able to capture non-linearities arising from combining key indicators, the 
weighting approach may be oversimplifying: it is not clear that all criteria are equally important for all 
markets, or at all times. As suggested by IMF et al. 2009, a qualitative framework could be used to 
integrate the different components of the assessment and help arrive at judgments of systemic 
importance, where a high degree of judgment founded in a detailed knowledge of the functioning of the 
financial system is required in any assessment of systemic importance; this is the rationale behind the 
herein presented approach.  
28 Exhibit B displays a graphical representation of the results of the survey, where the non-linearities 
captured by deconstructing expert knowledge (i.e. the right skew of the distribution) contrast with the 
linearity (i.e. symmetry) of a purely quantitative weighting approach.    
 19 
 
intuitive, where the latter means that for the issue in hand the higher the input (size, 
connectedness and non-substitutability), the higher or equal the systemic importance; 
as presented below (Figure 8 and Exhibit D), surface plots may be depicted as 
complete and continuous.   
 
 
3.3  The Fuzzy Logic inference system and the systemic importance 
index         
As in Figure 3, three trapezoidal membership functions are used to evaluate the degree 
of membership to the four key indicators ([A], [B], [C], [D]), where three membership 
functions or categories exist [LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH]. As in Figure 5, seven 
trapezoidal membership functions are used to evaluate the degree of membership to 
the output (i.e. systemic importance), where seven membership functions or categories 
exist [VERY LOW / LOW / MEDIUM LOW / MEDIUM / MEDIUM HIGH / HIGH / VERY 
HIGH]. After including the expert knowledge of Colombia’s financial authorities’ officers 
and technical staff (i.e. the inference rules), the FLIS would look like in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7 
Systemic importance as a Fuzzy Logic Inference System 
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Key indicators
(inputs)
ExpertFuzzy System SystemicImportance Index
(output)20 
 
The resulting systemic importance surfaces are displayed in Figure 8. They exhibit 
different combinations of key indicators and the Systemic Importance Index level they 
yield according to the expert knowledge deconstructed via the mentioned survey 




Resulting systemic importance surfaces 
(non-displayed key indicators set equal to 7) 
 
 [A] and [B]  [A] and [C] 
 
[A] and [D]  [B] and [C] 
 
[B] and [D]  [C] and [D] 
Source: authors’ calculations, based on the survey (Exhibit A). 
                                                 
29 It is worth emphasizing that the displayed surfaces (Figure 8) correspond to the case in which the non-
displayed key indicators in each plot are set equal to 7. If this assumption is modified the surfaces will 
vary; therefore, the displayed surfaces do not cover all the possible combinations of key indicators. Exhibit 









































































































































































































































































































4  Systemic importance assessment
30  
Based on the proposed method for obtaining the Systemic Importance Index, this 
section uses May 2011 data to calculate the individual systemic importance of the 
financial institutions participating in Colombia’s large-value payment system (CUD). 
During May 2011 the main financial institutions directly participating in the CUD were 





Main Colombian market’s financial institutions directly participating in CUD  
(as of May 2011)
d 






Commercial Bank (CB)  Provision of deposit and loans, including mortgages. [21] 
Commercial Financial 
Corporation (CFC) 
Provision of deposit and loans focused on goods and services 
commercialization (e.g. leasing). [20] 
Financial Corporation 
(CF) 
Provision of deposit and loans focused on medium term industrial 




Mutual Fund (MF) 
Provision of investment vehicles with the purpose of investing in 
securities and other assets according to the risk profile of the 
investor. [27] 
Brokerage Firm (BF) 
Provision of brokerage services with the purpose of buying and 
selling securities (e.g. stocks, bonds, currencies); allowed to trade 
for its own account. [26] 
Pension Fund Manager 
(PFM) 
Provision of investment vehicles with the purpose of investing for 
retirement. [6] 
Other
 b  Insurance companies, financial cooperatives and other.
  [18] 
a Financial cooperatives pertain to Credit Institutions; due to their low contribution to the CUD and their size 
they were included in the “Other” class; CIs are the only institutions able to receive last-resort lending liquidity.  
b The “Other” class gathers financial institutions characterized by their particularly low (or nil) relevance for the 
key systemic importance indicators.  
c  Only the main differencing feature appears; the number of institutions as of May 2011 appears in brackets.  
d Financial infrastructures and official financial institutions are excluded from this Table and were not analyzed.   
Source: León et al. (2011). 
 
 
Each financial institution’s systemic importance key indicator was estimated according 
to Table 1. Indicators [A], [B] were obtained from statistical data from the Banking 
Superintendence of Colombia. [C] and [D] were obtained based on large-value 
payment system’s databases (Banco de la República-CUD), and calculated as 
described in Exhibit B.    
 
The main quantitative assessment of systemic importance is displayed in Figure 9. 
Each financial institution’s Systemic Importance Index is mapped as a triangle in a 0 to 
10 scale, where each level in the y-axis corresponds to a different type of institution. It 
is worth emphasizing that the Index provides a relative assessment of each institution’s 
systemic importance: an Index equal to cero does not correspond to the –absolute- 
                                                 
30 Results are illustrative. They may not be used to infer credit quality or to make any type of assessment 
for any financial institution. Results do not represent an opinion or statement of Banco de la República nor 
of its Board of Directors. The name of each institution is not revealed due to disclosure restrictions. 
31 For a brief introduction to the functioning and characteristics of the Colombian large-value payments 
system (CUD), please refer to Banco de la República (2011), León et al. (2011), Machado et al. (2010) or 
Cepeda (2008).  22 
 
absence of systemic importance for that institution, but a negligible importance with 
respect to the most important institution.  
 
Figure 9 
Systemic Importance Index 
(as of May 2011) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
The types which concentrate most systemic importance in the Colombian financial 
market are commercial banks (CBs) and brokerage firms (BFs), as in León et al. (2011) 
and Machado et al. (2010). According to the definition of systemic importance as a 
fuzzy variable (Figure 5) CBs and BFs are the only type of institutions pertaining to 
some degree to the HIGH and VERY HIGH categories (i.e. membership functions).  
 
An important attribute of the Systemic Importance Index is its high level of skewness 
(Figure 10). Only a few financial institutions (4) pertain to some degree to the HIGH or 
VERY HIGH categories of systemic importance, whilst most of the participants (83) 
pertain to some degree to the LOW and VERY LOW categories.  
 
Figure 10 
Distribution of the Systemic Importance Index 
(as of May 2011) 
  
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 







































































Such skewness confirms the intuition regarding the high degree of asymmetry (right 
skew) of systemic importance, where the average institution is of low systemic 
importance and the average default or failure-to-pay results in low systemic severity. In 
this case the average financial institution’s Systemic Importance Index is 1.33, and 
pertains to some degree to the LOW and VERY LOW categories; thus, relying on the 
systemic importance of the average financial institution would divert financial 
authorities from its aim of ever preserving financial stability and payment systems 
safety.  
 
The overall view of systemic importance of Figure 9 may also be conveniently 
desegregated into its key indicators. Figure 11 displays the four systemic importance 
key indicators for all the analyzed financial institutions.  
 
Figure 11  
Systemic importance key indicators 
(as of May 2011) 
 
[A] Volume of deposits and money market 
borrowing 
[B] Volume of financial assets under management 
[C] Contribution to the payment system  [D] Betweenness centrality 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
As expected, CBs emerge as particularly important due to their volume of deposits and 
money market borrowing, along with their contribution to the large-value payment 
system (CUD). Regarding betweennes centrality (Figure 11, lower-right panel), a CB 
resulted as the only institution that would systemically endanger financial and payment 
system stability because its absence resulted in the disconnection of two participants of 
the CUD (an insurance company and a brokerage firm); therefore, the absolute 





































































































Two brokerage firms (BFs) display some degree of HIGH and VERY HIGH contribution 
to the large-value payment system, even significantly higher than most CBs; this is 
intuitive since their primary role is the provision of buying and selling services under a 
broker-dealer scheme. Since the main source of systemic importance of these two BFs 
is their contribution to the large-value payment system (Figure 11, lower-left panel), it is 
worthwhile noting that their overall systemic importance (Figure 9) suggests that the 
experts taking the survey already regard the too-connected-to-fail criteria as important 
as the too-connected-to-fail criteria, which concurs with developments after the most 
recent episode of global financial crisis.  
 
It also important to highlight that network theory based on payment system data 
allowed identifying those two BFs as systemically important due to their 
connectedness. This is not the result of financial system’s balance sheet being 
exposed to BFs, but the result of the financial system relying on these BFs’ continuous 
provision of their services; as the upper-left panel of Figure 11 reveals, these two BFs’ 
systemic importance would have been missed if using network theory based on 
traditional balance sheet data.           
 
Finally, pension fund managers (PFMs) and mutual funds (MFs) display their systemic 
importance as the main portfolio managers of the financial system, with a –relative- 
minor involvement in the large-value payment system.  
 
 
5 Final  remarks 
As pointed out by León et al. (2011), the most recent episode of global market turmoil 
exposed the limitations resulting from institution-centric metrics and the –resulting- 
traditional focus on too-big-to-fail institutions within an increasingly systemic-crisis-
prone financial system. This has encouraged the appearance of the too-connected-to-
fail concept, and has resulted in the emergence of several challenges regarding the 
estimation of financial institutions’ systemic importance by financial authorities.  
 
As previously documented, the main challenges relate to considering measures 
corresponding to size,  substitutability and connectedness, and using methodologies 
able to capture judgment (i.e. detailed knowledge) of the functioning of the financial 
system, and capable of yielding non-binary results (IMF et al., 2009).  
 
Despite these challenges are intricate by nature, there are methodologies that may 
overcome some of the difficulties. First, as has been recently discussed in systemic risk 
literature and included in the herein proposed model, network theory may effectively 
assess financial institutions’ connectedness and substitutability. Second, as supported 
by literature on network theory application to financial systems’ analysis (Leon et al., 
2011; Machado et al., 2010; Cepeda, 2008; Soramäki et al., 2006; Bech and Garrat, 
2006; Ianoka et al., 2004), large-value payment system data was used to better 
approximate the way financial institutions interact with each other. Third, analogous to 
the approach chosen by NASA for safe and reliable autonomous rover navigation 
(Seraji, H., 2000) and autonomous landing on planetary surfaces (Serrano and Seraji, 
2007; Howard and Seraji, 2002), the proposed Fuzzy Logic-based systemic importance 
                                                 
32 Exhibit B also presents some illustrative estimations for February and June 2006, and September 2009, 
where several participants display various levels of betweenness centrality. 25 
 
index allows for circumventing some shortcomings faced by traditional quantitative 
methods when a high degree of expert judgment is required.  
 
As demonstrated throughout the document the proposed methodology allowed for (i) 
capturing ambiguous (non-binary) concepts such as size,  substitutability and 
connectedness; (ii) simultaneously evaluating each financial institution’s relative size, 
substitutability and connectedness in an intuitive manner that mimics human reasoning; 
(iii) considering the intrinsic functioning of the local financial system by means of expert 
knowledge; and (iv) obtaining a relative, non-binary, intuitive and practical quantitative 
assessment (i.e. the Index) for identifying systemic importance within Colombia’s 
financial market.   
 
Results obtained by the proposed methodology are straightforward and grant financial 
authorities with the ability to acquire a comprehensive relative assessment of each 
financial institution’s systemic importance. This may serve the purpose of assisting 
financial authorities in focusing their attention and resources –the intensity of oversight, 
supervision and regulation- where the systemic severity resulting from a financial 
institution failing or near-failing is estimated to be the greatest. Moreover, identifying 
systemically important institutions may also serve financial authorities for enhanced 
policy-making (e.g. prudential regulation, oversight and supervision) and decision-
making (e.g. resolving, restructuring or providing emergency liquidity). 
 
It is important to emphasize that focusing on the systemic importance departs from the 
traditional (as in Norman et al. (2009)) focus on systemic risk. As previously explained, 
authors justify such shift after documenting that focusing on the level of risk (i.e. 
frequency times severity) may mislead financial authorities from closely overseeing 
financial institutions capable of generating extreme systemic disturbances; this is, 
involving the probability of systemic events occurring may result in authorities 
overseeing, supervising and regulating for a severe systemic shock based on the 
impact of a single –systemically modest- average institution.      
 
It is also important to call attention to the importance of connectedness for the experts 
taking the survey. Two brokerage firms resulted as pertaining to some degree to the 
HIGH and VERY HIGH systemically important, only surpassed by two commercial 
banks. Since the main source of systemic importance of these two BFs is their 
contribution to the large-value payment system, it is worthwhile noting that their overall 
systemic importance (Figure 9) suggests that the experts taking the survey already 
regard the too-connected-to-fail criteria as important as the too-big-to-fail criteria, which 
concurs with developments after the most recent episode of global financial crisis.    
 
Additional advantages from the proposed approach are parsimony and ease of 
calculation, which would allow for convenient continuous (e.g. monthly) monitoring of 
systemic importance, and for the ability to capture the dynamics of the financial market 
(e.g. financial innovations, regulatory changes, etc.) via periodic revisions (e.g. yearly) 
of the survey.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the proposed methodology is by no 
means a substitute for sound judgment by financial authorities, or the sole metric to use 
when deciding the systemic importance of a financial institution. Authors regard this 
methodology as providing a valuable and novel relative metric for assessing systemic 
importance by financial authorities, which conveniently complements existing methods. 
 
Moreover, financial authorities are to decide whether an important/unimportant 
threshold is to be defined within the Systemic Importance Index. Despite authors 
consider that defining such threshold is intricate and outside the scope of this 26 
 
document, they suggest considering (i) the purpose of defining the threshold (e.g. for 
defining a capital charge or deciding which institutions to follow closely); (ii) the degree 
of clustering of the Index (i.e. its skewness); and (iii) a detailed knowledge of the 
functioning of the financial system.  
 
Regarding this proposal some challenges still remain. First, this document focuses on 
financial institutions, which may be conveniently characterized by the chosen set of key 
factors. Other participants of the financial system, such as those labeled as market 
utilities (e.g. central counterparty clearing houses, electronic payments networks, large 
and non-large value payment systems), may not be adequately characterized by 
financial institutions’ set of factors. It is in the authors’ research agenda to identify those 
key factors that may help characterize financial market utilities in a convenient and 
comprehensive manner, and to develop an appropriate methodology for identifying and 
assessing their systemic importance.  
 
Second, financial institutions tend to pertain to a financial conglomerate. Because it is 
intuitive that the systemic importance arising from merging two financial institutions is 
different (i.e. expectedly higher) than the mere weighted sum of their systemic 
importance, it is of great importance to address financial conglomerates’ systemic 
importance. Therefore, it is in the authors’ research agenda to assess conglomerates’ 
systemic importance based on the herein proposed approach.  
   
Third, other key factors for assessing financial institutions’ systemic importance may 
emerge from further research, as those proposed by BCBS-BIS (2011) regarding 
cross-jurisdictional activity and complexity. Despite it is rather uncomplicated to add a 
new key factor to the (four) herein proposed, the construction of the knowledge base 
may turn particularly dense. For example, the number of rules in the survey for four key 
indicators with three categories yields 81 rules, whereas five (six) key indicators with 
three categories yields 243 (729) rules. This may be tackled to some extent with the 
use of rules with the NOT operator, but could also complicate the survey.        
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Source: authors’ design  
                                                 
34 The order of the rules was modified (randomized) for the survey.  
1 High High High High 33
2 High High High Low 80
3 High High High Medium 59
4 High High Low High 3
5 High High Low Low 17
6 High High Low Medium 37
7 High High Medium High 28
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9 High High Medium Medium 29
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8  Exhibit B: Assessing connectedness and substitutability with 
network analysis basics 
As explained throughout the document, literature recognizes three criteria as key to 
measuring and identifying systemic importance: size,  connectedness and 
substitutability (IMF et al., 2009; Manning et al., 2009). Because of their novelty and 
intricacy, the first two sections of this exhibit briefly describe the methodologies 
imported from network analysis in order to measure connectedness and 
substitutability
35, where the third section displays some results obtained with the 
described methodologies.   
 
In order to make this exhibit comprehensible please acknowledge the following 
concepts (Table B1), which pertain to network analysis terminology.   
 
Table B1
Network analysis basic terminology 
Term Description 
Vertex  The fundamental unit of a network. Also referred as node, actor or participant. 
Edge  The line connecting two vertices. Also referred as bond, link or tie. It may be directed if 
runs in only one direction or undirected if it runs in both directions.  
Degree  The number of edges connected to a vertex. In-degree (out-degree) refers to the 
number of incoming (outgoing) edges.  
Geodesic path 
It is the shortest path through the network from one vertex to another. Note that there 
may be more than one geodesic path between two vertices, and that in a directed 
network the geodesic path may be different from one vertex to another and its reverse. 
Distance 
The number of links that is minimally needed to connect two vertices. Neighbors (directly 
connected) have distance equal to 1; neighbors of neighbors that are not directly 
connected are at distance 2, and so forth.  
Source: authors’ design, based on Buechel and Buskens (2008) and Newman (2003). 
 
In Figure B1 the previous concepts could be applied as follows: the graph consists of 
seven vertices or nodes (i.e. A, B, C, D, E, F, G), where the A node is connected to 
nodes E and D via two undirected edges
36 (i.e. incoming/outgoing from/to E and D); 
thus, the in-degree and out-degree of A is two. There are two geodesic paths from 
nodes A to G, consisting of three edges (i.e. the path A-D-F-G and the path A-E-F-G).  
 
Figure B1 
A simple undirected network 
 
Source: authors’ design 
                                                 
35 Network analysis provides many other metrics and measures related to centrality. This exhibit focuses 
on the approach chosen by the authors. For a comprehensive review and explanation of alternative 
metrics and measures please refer to Newman (2010).  
36 Because network analysis is to be applied to payments, where each payment is necessarily related to 
an immediate, previous or forthcoming transfer of a financial asset (e.g. a bond, a stock, money, etc.), 









8.1  Connectedness 
The main intuition of the connectedness criteria asserts that the larger the number –
and volume- of the links an institution maintains with other market participants, the 
larger the contagion or spillovers it may generate; this is, the systemic importance of a 
financial institution generally increases with its degree of connectedness.  
 
According to Newman (2010) and de Nooy et al. (2005), the simplest centrality 
measure in a network is the degree of a vertex; this is, the number of edges connected 
to it, or the number of its neighbors. This type of centrality metric assesses how 
intensely the vertex is connected to the network, which relates in our case to how 
easily can payments arrive to or spread from that vertex. For example, in Figure B1 the 
most central vertex (i.e. with most edges) is D, which has five of them. 
 
It is common to find that the degree of each vertex is normalized with respect to the 
highest degree attainable. Let   be the number of vertices in a network, and    the 
degree of vertex D, then (  1 ) is the highest degree attainable, then the degree 
centrality of vertex D (  ) may be expressed as in [F1]. Please note that if a vertex is 
connected to all the other vertices of the network its degree centrality will equal 1, 
whilst an isolated vertex (not connected to the network) will yield a degree centrality 
equal to 0.  
 
    
  




Therefore, because of its documented simplicity and usefulness, authors rely on 
degree centrality as a customary metric for connectedness. Nevertheless, degree 
centrality of a vertex or node would suffice to assess its centrality only if all edges are 
judged as equally important; this is the standard case of network analysis applied to 
social relations or informational networks. In the case in hand, where edges represent 
payments, it is convenient to recognize the importance of each edge according to the 
value of the payments it intends to represent. 
 
Consequently, as in other applications of network analysis
37, it is important to consider 
each edge’s strength, weight or value. Let Figure B2 be a weighted version of Figure 
B1, where each edge’s number represents the weight of the connection between the 
vertices. It is rather evident that vertex D remains as the most important regarding the 
weight of the edges it shares with other vertices, with weights adding up to 13.       
 
Figure B2 
A weighted network 
 
Source: authors’ design 
                                                 
37 A common case of weighted networks is the bandwidth or the amount of data flowing between nodes 














Considering the edges’ weights provides new information that was not apparent when 
using degree centrality. Vertices B and C in Figure B1 appear to be equally central, 
both with two undirected edges, both sharing connections between themselves and to 
vertex D; moreover, when calculating the degree centrality as in [F1], B and C yield the 
same result (      1   ⁄         1   ⁄  2 6 ⁄  0 . 3 3 ). Despite sharing the same 
degree centrality, it is rather clear in Figure B2 that considering weights would signal 
vertex B as being more intensely connected than vertex C, with weights equal to 6 and 
3, respectively.  
 
Analogous to degree centrality, authors normalize the total weight of each vertex with 
respect to the sum of each vertex’s edge weight.
38 Let     represent the total weigh of 
all the edges of vertex  , each vertex’s share of the network’s weight (   ) may be 
expressed as in [F2]. 
     
     
   
∑    
 




Vertex D, which displays the most weight, yields a 0.342 share of the network’s weight. 
Calculating B’s and C’s share of the network’s weight would yield 0.158 and 0.079, 
respectively, avoiding considering B and C as equally important within the network 
because of exhibiting the same number of edges. Unfortunately, comparing B’s and F’s 
share of the network’s weight (both 0.158) would consider these two vertices as equally 
important to the network despite F has one more neighbor than B.    
 
Because both approaches to assessing the intensity of the connection are valuable for 
the case in hand (i.e. payments), where the systemic importance increases with the 
number of connected institutions and with the share of the total payments, the authors 
use the product
39 of both metrics as an overall measure of the contribution to the 
payment system (   ), as in [F3]: 
 
              [F3]
 
Based on Figure B2, the result of employing such approach is presented in Table B2, 
where      corresponds to the  -vertex overall contribution to the network, and 
        corresponds to the standardized value of     in a 0 to 10 scale.
40   
 
It is worth noticing that (i) the vertex most contributing to the network is D, receiving the 
highest score in the 0 to 10 scale, which is intuitive since is the vertex with most 
connections and with the highest share of the network’s weight; (ii) the vertex less 
contributing to the network is G, receiving the lowest score; (iii) vertices B and C are no 
longer deemed as equally important as with degree centrality alone, where B is more 
important than C because of the latter’s edges weights; and (iv) vertices B and F are no 
longer deemed as equally important as with the share to the network’s total weight, 
                                                 
38 Please note that the calculation of     as in [F2] counts separately the weights in either direction between 
each vertex pair, which results in counting each weigh twice. As pointed out by Newman (2010), it is 
possible to compensate for this double-counting by dividing each weight by 2; nevertheless it makes little 
difference since the analysis focuses on the relative magnitudes and not the absolute values. Moreover, 
this notation allows for applying [F2] to directed networks as well.   
39 Please note that multiplying both metrics (i.e. the degree centrality and the share of the network’s total 
weight) is analogous to using the AND –conjunction- operator in Fuzzy Logic (Cox, 1994). If a vertex 
displays both a high (low) level of centrality AND a high (low) level of contribution to the network’s total 
weight, then the product of both levels will be high (low).    
40 As previously introduced (footnote 14), this standardization procedure assigns the maximum index value 
(10) to the most contributing vertex, and the rest is assigned an index value by means of linear 
interpolation. Such standardization is straightforward and makes comparisons and calculations easier. 34 
 
where F is more important than B because of the former’s number of edges . Hence, as 
displayed in Table B2, using the product of both metrics allows for comprehensively 
and intuitively assessing the importance of the network’s vertices.    
 
Table B2
Contribution to the network 
Vertex                          
A 0,3333  0,1053  0,0351  1,2 
B 0,3333  0,1579  0,0526  1,8 
C 0,3333  0,0789  0,0263  0,9 
D 0,8333  0,3421  0,2851  10,0 
E 0,5000  0,1053  0,0526  1,8 
F 0,5000  0,1579  0,0789  2,8 
G 0,1667  0,0526  0,0088  0,3 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
 
8.2  Substitutability 
The severity of the impact of a payment system failure, and hence the extent of 
systemic risk, depends critically on whether substitutes are readily available to allow 
payment flows to be rerouted via another system (Manning et al. 2009). Consequently, 
the systemic importance of a financial institution generally decreases with its degree of 
substitutability.  
 
A key concept for assessing substitutability comes from network analysis’   
betweenness centrality.  Betweenness centrality measures the brokerage role of a 
certain vertex within a network (Buechel and Buskens, 2008) or, as defined by de Nooy 
et al. (2005), it captures the extent to which a vertex is needed as a link in the chain of 
contacts that facilitate the spread of information within a network; the more a vertex is a 
go-between, the more central its position in the network. 
 
The calculation of betweenness centrality relies on the geodesic path concept, which is 
the shortest path through the network from one vertex to another. It is calculated for 
vertex   as the proportion of all geodesic paths between pairs of other vertices that 
include such vertex (de Nooy et al., 2005). Let     be the number of geodesic paths 
between vertices   and  , and    
   the number of geodesic paths between   and   that 
go through vertex  , betweenness centrality of vertex   (  ) is calculated as in [F4]: 
 
      
   
 
      
,       0 ,   ,   ,    
[F4]
 
Nevertheless, because substitutability is related to the severity of the impact of a vertex 
being removed, which depends on whether substitutes are readily available to allow 
preserving the distances between vertices, betweenness centrality by itself fails to 
address this criteria in a proper manner. Betweenness centrality captures the 
importance of a vertex as an intermediary between all the others vertices that compose 
the network, but it does not capture the severity of the impact resulting from the 
removal of a vertex.  
 35 
 
Because  substitutability relates to the severity of the impact for the geodesic path 
between vertices   and   (   ) resulting from the removal of a  -vertex, which could be 
conveniently defined in terms of distance between the remaining vertices, please 
consider that there are three possible scenarios resulting from removing   from the 
network: (i) there is no change in the distance corresponding to the geodesic path 
between vertices   and   (   ) because other vertex or vertices could substitute the 
removed  -vertex, or because the  -vertex does not pertain to the geodesic path (   ); 
(ii) other vertex or vertices could substitute the removed  -vertex, but with an increase 
in the distance corresponding to the new geodesic path between vertices   and   (   ); 
and (iii) there is no other vertex or vertices which may serve the purpose of indirectly 
connecting vertices   and  , hence there would be no geodesic path between them 
(     0 ), and the distance between vertices   and   would be defined as a number 
larger than any other possible distance in the network.
41  
 
These three scenarios are depicted in Figure B3. The vertex removed changes in each 
panel of the figure, and the geodesic path to be analyzed is the one corresponding to 
connecting vertices C and H: 
 
Figure B3 
Scenarios of substitutability 
Geodesic path connecting vertices C and H 
 
Scenario (i)  
Removal of A 
No change in distance 
Scenario (ii)  
Removal of D 
Increase in the distance 
Scenario (iii)  
Removal of E 
Disconnection 
     
Source: authors’ design 
 
In Scenario (i) the impact resulting from the removal of vertex A is nil; the geodesic 
path between C and H (   ) comprises two vertices (D and E, with a total distance of 
3), where vertex A is not present. In Scenario (ii) the impact from the removal of vertex 
D is an increase in the distance between C an H, which increases from 3 to 4 where 
vertices G, F and E belong to this new geodesic path. Scenario (iii) exhibits the third 
case, where the removal of vertex E results in the impossibility of connecting vertices C 
and H.  
 
Consequently, for the relation between vertices C and H, vertex E is not substitutable 
(i.e. no other vertex or vertices are able to fulfill its role), vertex A is not relevant (i.e. 
the geodesic path does not includes vertex A), and vertex D is substitutable but with an 
increase in the distance between C and H. This result is relevant and emphasizes the 
importance of considering both connectedness and substitutability: degree centrality 
                                                 
41 Buechel and Buskens (2008) suggest assigning a number larger than any possible actual distance in the 
network for those pairs of vertices that cannot reach each other, and choose to use  ; this is also the 























alone would consider Figure B3’s vertex E as of lower systemic importance than D (i.e. 
E has less edges than D), and would not recognize that the removal of D does not 
result in a major disruption in the network (i.e. it would be substituted by using other –
longer- paths), whilst the removal of E would result in a vertex being disconnected from 
the network.    
 
Accordingly, the approach chosen by the authors to assess the substitutability of each 
vertex comprising the network consists of an iterative procedure of the analysis just 
described. This is, (i) calculating the average distance of the geodesic paths for all the 
vertices within the network; (ii) removing a vertex from the network and recalculating 
the average distance of the geodesic paths for all the vertices within the network; (iii) 
calculating the increase in the average distance of all the geodesic paths after 
removing the vertex; (iv) repeating these steps for all the network’s vertices.  
 
This procedure will yield each vertex’s effect on the average distance of the geodesic 
paths of the network, which is a distance-based metric for assessing the severity of the 
impact of a vertex being removed, and a useful metric for substitutability. It is expected 
that (i) removing a perfectly substitutable vertex (i.e. may be substituted without 
increasing the distance of the geodesic paths) will result in a constant average distance 
of the geodesic paths for all vertices within the network; (ii) removing a non-perfectly 
substitutable vertex will result in an increase in the average distance of the geodesic 
paths, whereas the magnitude of the increase is negatively related to the 
substitutability of the vertex; and (iii) removing a non-substitutable vertex will result in 
an increase in the average distance of the geodesic paths and the disconnection of one 
or more vertices of the network.        
 
 
8.3 Comparison  of  connectedness and non-substitutability indexes 
This section presents the results for the connectedness and substitutability indexes as 
of February and June 2006, and September 2009 for Colombian large-value payments 
system; as described in Leon et al. (2011) and Machado et al. (2010), this three 
periods correspond to low and high volatility of the Colombian local debt market, and to 
high liquidity of the large-value payment system, respectively.      
 
Figure B4 
Connectedness and non-substitutability indexes 
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Source: authors’ calculations 
 
Despite this section’s main purpose is solely to present the results of the usage of the 
connectedness and non-substitutability indexes as presented in this exhibit, the reader 
should be aware of the following:  
 
•  As argued in the first section of the document, it is evident that connectedness 
and  substitutability indexes are distributed with a high degree of asymmetry 
(right skew) and excess kurtosis, where the average institution is of low 
connectedness and high substitutability. Therefore, focusing on the average 
institution for assessing systemic risk would be inappropriate.  
• Despite  connectedness and non-substitutability appear to be somewhat related 
(i.e. CBs and BFs both display high index levels in Figure B4), they capture 
different characteristics of financial institutions. Not all too-connected institutions 
are too-non-substitutable and vice versa.      
•  It is important to realize that the more connected (e.g. the more contributing to 
the payment system, the more money market counterparties) and the bigger 
(i.e. the more assets under management, the more deposits and money market 
liabilities) a financial institution is, the more relevant its degree of substitutability. 
This is a non-linear feature worth acknowledging when considering 
connectedness and substitutability as key indicators for systemic importance.    
•  As in León et al. (2011) and Machado et al. (2010), connectedness index 
displays that commercial banks (CBs) and brokerage firms (BFs) are the most 
connected institutions within the Colombian large-value payments system 
(CUD).  
•  As a complement to León et al. (2011) and Machado et al. (2010), the herein 
introduced  non-substitutability  and  connectedness indexes concur with their 
centrality index, where systemically important financial institutions are 
circumscribed to commercial banks (CBs), brokerage firms (BFs) and financial 
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9  Exhibit C: A graphical display of the survey’s results 
This exhibit displays a graphical representation of experts’ judgment concerning how 
the systemic risk builds up when combining the four key indicators (i.e. [A], [B], [C], [D]) 





Source: authors’ calculations 
 
When using a purely quantitative approach such as the equally weighted sum (dashed 
blue line) or the unequally weighted sum of the key indicators (dotted black line) the 
result is a symmetric distribution that peaks around the MEDIUM systemic importance 
level, where VERY LOW and VERY HIGH systemic importance is exclusive of all-LOW 
(rule #41) or all-HIGH (rule #1) combinations in Exhibit A, correspondingly.
42 Therefore, 
most of the combinations are to be considered of MEDIUM systemic importance. 
 
When using a qualitative approach based on expert knowledge the systemic 
importance distribution appears skewed to the right. Experts’ aggregated judgment (red 
solid line) shows that they consider that systemic importance results from a non-linear 
combination of the key indicators, where accumulating systemic importance key factors 
within a single institution results in a rapidly increasing overall systemic importance. It 
is remarkable to find that experts’ aggregated judgment consider of VERY-HIGH 
systemic importance other combinations besides the all-HIGH combination (rule #1 in 
Exhibit A). It is also remarkable that experts consider that most of the systemic 
importance key indicators combinations are to be considered of MEDIUM HIGH 
systemic importance, with VERY-LOW and LOW importance resulting from very few 
combinations.  
 
The rationale behind such judgment from the experts is rather simple. Systemic 
importance arising from merging two financial institutions is different (i.e. expectedly 
higher) than the mere weighted sum of their systemic importance.
43 Similarly, 
aggregating systemic risk key indicators within a single financial institution is 
expectedly higher than the mere weighted sum of its key indicators.  
 
                                                 
42 The equally weighted case corresponds to the BCBS-BIS (2011) consultative document. The unequally 
weighted consisted of the following weights: [A] 35%; [B] 20%; [C] 30%; [D] 15%, for illustrative purposes.  
43 In this sense aggregating systemic importance key indicators is the inverse of aggregating volatility in 
Portfolio Theory, where calculating the weighted sum of volatilities ignores diversification effects taking 
place; likewise, calculating the weighted sum of systemic importance key indicators may ignore systemic 


























10 Exhibit  D:  Resulting  systemic importance surfaces 
Figure D1 
Resulting systemic importance surfaces 
(non-displayed key indicators set equal to 5) 
 
 [A] and [B]  [A] and [C] 
 
[A] and [D]  [B] and [C] 
 
[B] and [D]  [C] and [D] 




















































































































Deposits and Borrowing Non-substitutability
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